pit bull

A PitBull Name Priya Manickchand on the Loose, Also answer by the Name BOOO.


Priya Manickchand

…attempts to humiliate US Ambassador

In what can only be the most shocking abuse of hospitality and a disregard for the diplomatic norms, Guyana’s Acting

Foreign Minister, Priya Manickchand, last evening launched into an attack on United States Ambassador, Dr. D. Brent Hardt. And for her efforts she was soundly booed by the invitees.
The occasion was the observance of America’s 238th anniversary of its independence. Just two days earlier, Ambassador Hardt, addressing a youth forum called Blue Caps, was critical of the Guyana Government for its failure to hold Local Government elections.

This so rankled the ruling People’s Progressive Party that yesterday, it issued a statement that chided Ambassador Hardt for meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign government. Minister Manickchand extended this criticism when she shared the podium at the American Independence Anniversary, last night.
Early in her speech she lauded Ambassador Hardt for his comments about Guyana. “For a very long time, we were a country that lacked free and fair elections. Thanks to your good record keeping and declassification of documents, we have confirmed that those elections were presented by external forces effectively retarding the democratic process.”

She then launched into an attack on the comments of the Ambassador but not before she had noted the absence of democracy in some agencies. She said that there is a situation today where Guyana must comply with certain international acts.
“Our banks will soon have to comply” with a measure that will see local commercial banks providing information to the United States Government on American citizens banking in Guyana.

“We have to comply with what Big Brother wants.” By the same measure, Guyana cannot expect the United States to accept or to comply with actions demanded against it. Antigua and Barbuda secured a ruling by the World Trade Organisation against the United States which is still to comply with that decision.

Below is an excerpt of her address at the independence anniversary celebration.

Ambassador Brent Hardt
“The occasion is mine tonight to reflect specifically on the activities of the representative of the US Government here, Ambassador Brent Hardt. Less than three years ago, Ambassador Hardt was made welcome to Guyana.

 Shortly after bombarding Hardt’s US Ambassador to Guyana, the  PitBull Priya Manickchand Acting as Foreign Minister, and Presidential Advisor on Governance, AKA Wilkinson Razor Blade Gail Teixeira walked out of the reception that was held at the Ambassador’s residence. Manickchand said Hardt’s tenure resulted in tensions between the two countries.


Shortly after bombarding Hardt’s US Ambassador to Guyana, the PitBull Priya Manickchand Acting as Foreign Minister, and Presidential Advisor on Governance, AKA Wilkinson Razor Blade Gail Teixeira walked out of the reception that was held at the Ambassador’s residence. Manickchand said Hardt’s tenure resulted in tensions between the two countries.

During those years of his posting in Guyana, Ambassador Hardt has contributed to a tension-filled relationship with the Government of Guyana. These areas of tense relationships have attracted considerable efforts on our part to address oftentimes without much success.
Ambassador Hardt’s most recent assault on the President and Government of Guyana in his remarks to the recently created NGO, the Blue Caps, has in our judgment, gone beyond the boundaries of professionalism and diplomacy.
For a professional Foreign Service Office, with the appointment of an Ambassador, to make such declarations, accusations, allegations and innuendos about the Executive President of Guyana, or of any country for that matter, is to our mind, totally unacceptable.
As one reads his diatribe against our President, our outrage mounts at the liberties he has taken with diplomatic conventions, commitment to accuracy and sense of occasion. This situation, I report, is intolerable. The Ambassador has been associated with a dedicated attack on the President and the government on the holding of Local Government elections.

The Ambassador has been supported in his…this ill-conceived venture, by the opposition section of the media and his colleagues in the diplomatic corps. We have not lost any efforts in correcting their hopelessly jaundiced views of the situation.
His superficial grasp is revealed by his misinformation about the Bill. Worse yet, is his reluctance to have views of the hosting of Local Government elections corroborated by other knowledgeable stakeholders, other than the Chairman of GECOM. The Ambassador’s behaviour is totally unacceptable.

It is this government’s pledge that it will not accept such. The superpower status of the United States is acknowledged. Ambassador Brent (sic) has probably presented Guyana’s…America’s credentials as a model nation for the rest of the world. His reported declarations to the Blue Cap (sic) NGO, made in his presentation, unreservedly laud America and its democratic norms and practices. All of us here know better.
Among us here, the memory of 1950 to 1960 US interference in Guyana persists. All of us here…are daily reminded of the consequences of America’s zeal to democratize the world…And the consequences and the people of Guyana live those consequences until today. Those consequences question the Ambassador’s moral correctness in lecturing Guyana and for that matter the rest of the world.
For the Guyana Government, his nuanced resort to justifying insurrection in his remarks to the NGO Blue Caps, and here tonight, is profoundly disturbing. A collection of young minds being invited to such a mind-set for future engagement with an elected government warrants our immediate repudiation.
Like his President, Barack Obama, there exists a red line.

This Ambassador has crossed that line. Unlike his President, we are resolved, we have resolved and we so advise our partners, with whom we share conventions and symbiotic relations, this is our red line. Behaviour such as this would not be tolerated within the boundaries of mutual respect, diplomatic relations and inter-government collaboration.
In closing, we extend warmest greetings and congratulations to President Obama and the people of America on this historic occasion. I thank you.
Please allow me to propose a toast to the President of America and the people of the United States of America. Happy Independence.”
Soon after, in an unprecedented move, the Ambassador returned to the podium to proclaim. “Oh, What a send off!” He then challenged the government to provide evidence that he has not acted in the best interest of the country and its people.
He leaves Guyana in August. And Minister Manickchand, in the company of Presidential Advisor Gail Teixeira, staged a walk-out from the reception.

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egypt democractic transformation strategy – wikileaks


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 003001

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC STAFF FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KMPI, EG

SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATED DEMOCRACY STRATEGY

REF: STATE 130991

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

——-

Summary

——

1. (C) Our fundamental reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of political freedom and democratic pluralism, respect for human rights, and a stable, democratic and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak era. While our programs in the areas of judicial reform and decentralization are well-conceived and have had some notable successes, we propose to expand our support for civil society, especially through offshore programming. During the spring of 2007, Embassy Cairo, coordinating closely with Washington colleagues via shared draft papers and secure DVC discussions, drafted the following document which currently serves as the basis for our democracy promotion efforts in Egypt. End summary.

—————————————

Total Proposed Democracy and Governance Spending FY 2008 and 2009

—————————————

2. (SBU) The total proposed D and G spending for FY2008 will be USD 65-75 million with USD 11-13 million for off-shore programming and USD 54-62 million for ongoing and new on-shore programming. Total spending for FY2009 will be USD 75 million with USD 25 million for off-shore programming and USD 50 million for ongoing and new on-shore programming.

———————

Off-Shore Programming

———————

3. (C) Due to on-going GOE interference with U.S. democracy and human rights assistance programs, the Deputies Committee decided on April 10 to proceed with offshore programming as appropriate. Per this guidance, the interagency agreed to release USD 5 million in FY2007, USD 11-13 million in FY2008, and USD 25 million in FY2009. State will determine the administration of the programming funds. Decisions will be project-driven with a focus on competitive grants and low administrative overhead.

4. (SBU) FY2007: USD 5 million, to include support of:

(a) International Republican Institute (IRI): Workshops, strategic planning, and capacity building to assist in developing emerging leaders in all political parties. Focus is on current and emerging party leadership and reform-minded NGOs in preparation for the 2010 parliamentary elections and 2011 presidential election.

(b) National Democratic Institute (NDI): Train municipal candidates and campaign managers (with an emphasis on women) in advance of 2008 municipal elections, including a mix of in-country consultations and offshore training and exchanges. Build capacity of civil society organizations in election and governance monitoring, networking, and information sharing with counterparts.

(c) Freedom House: Fund off-shore human rights activities that may include training for bloggers, assistance to human rights lawyers, international coalition building with civil society, and off-shore civic education.

(d) IFES (formerly International Foundation for Election Systems): Work with reform-minded Egyptian NGOs and civic leaders to promote electoral reform and increase voter awareness, education, and registration, particularly among women and youth. Offshore and onshore programming will be included to increase knowledge of international standards for free, fair, and transparent elections; media regulation, and election administration. Technical assistance and training will be offered to the Supreme Elections Commission leading up to the 2008 municipal elections.

5. (SBU) FY 2008: USD 11-13 million: The above programs will continue and new programs will be added to include the following:

(a) MEPI-funded conference on the role of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in democratic politics: Meridian House to organize a conference for American academics and policy makers

(b) Expanding training of domestic and international election monitors. This could include work with the Ibn Khaldun Center and others.

(c) Training civil society and think tanks in public opinion polling.

(d) Strengthening advocacy skills of civil society and promoting exchanges, especially those focused on coalition building, youth and women, including small grants to be administered by the implementing NGO.

(e) Supporting programs aimed at advocacy for women,s rights and expanding the capacity of individuals and groups seeking to safeguard women,s rights and increase their political participation. This would also include a focus on trafficking in person.

(f) Providing onshore and offshore support and training for indigenous human rights efforts, including those focused on minorities, religious freedom, freedom speech, and youth.

(g) Providing training for independent media, internet-centered media, and increased public diplomacy.

6. (SBU) FY 2009: USD 25 million: Expanding the above programs and adding new programs to adapt to the new political environment, including efforts to prepare for the 2010 parliamentary elections and the 2011 presidential election.

————————————-

Breakdown of Ongoing and New On-Shore Programming: FY2008 and FY2009

————————————-

7. (C) President Mubarak is deeply skeptical of the U.S. role in democracy promotion. Nonetheless, USG programs are helping to establish democratic institutions and strengthen individual voices for change in Egypt. This change is often incremental and painstaking, but will also have enduring impact. We will sustain successful programs and create additional on-shore initiatives to optimize American influence through the looming leadership succession.

8. (SBU) Total funding for ongoing and new on-shore programming will be between USD 54-62 million for FY2008 with USD 28.5-31.5 million for in-country activities working with the GOE and USD 25.5-30.5 million for other in-country activities and USAID direct grants. Total funding in FY2009 is set at USD 50 million with USD 27 million for in-country activities working with the GOE and USD 23 million for other in-country activities and USAID direct grants.

9. (SBU) Proposed list of programs for in-country activities working with the GOE:

(a) Administration of Justice Support Project II: Improve the effectiveness of civil/commercial courts, streamline court procedures and enhance transparency.

(b) Family Justice: Strengthen the capacity of family justice system to mediate family disputes and increase access to family legal services.

(c) Criminal Justice: Provide more effective assistance of counsel to defendants through a public defense system and human rights training for prosecutors/judges.

(d) Constitutional Court: Enhance the role of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in judicial ethics, child abduction, and environmental law by deepening the legal knowledge and skills of members and increasing interaction with peers.

(e) Court of Cassation: Work with the court to make its rulings accessible, particularly to lower court judges.

(f) Parliament: Technical assistance and training to members and staff to strengthen their role in developing and implementing a reform agenda, improve representation, and strengthen skills as checks on the executive branch.

(g) Anti-Corruption/Public Accountability: Increase transparency in government operations and increase citizen demand for public accountability through a transparent budget, and transparency legislation, policies and conventions promoting public accountability.

(h) Decentralization: Develop a national policy and localpractices to decentralize selected financial, political and administrative authorities to regional and local governments to strengthen citizen participation and improve service delivery.

(i) Human Rights and National Councils: Strengthen quasi-government human rights councils (National Council for Human Rights, National Council for Women and National Council for Childhood and Motherhood) to protect human rights and combat violence against women and children.

(j) FTA Support: Provide technical assistance to help Egypt move its laws into compliance with requirements under a possible FTA, including workers, rights.

10. (SBU) Proposed list of programs for other in-country activities and USAID direct grant:

(a) USAID Direct Grants: Through grants to Egyptian NGOs, continue to support innovative Egyptian reform initiatives in political and electoral reform, increased political participation, civil society strengthening, civic education, human rights, women,s rights, community development, independent media, and transparency.

(b) Corruption: Support Transparency International and Egyptian NGOs to develop skills to combat corruption and advocate reforms to promote transparency and accountability in government and business.

(c) Labor: Promote freedom of association and reform of Egypt,s state-controlled labor unions through an agreement with the International Labor Organization and the AFL-CIO,s Solidarity Center.

(d) Independent Media: Build training capacity to promote professional development among journalists and managers; improve media management; and foster policy reform leading to the privatization of the print and broadcast sectors.

(e) Women,s Rights: Support Egyptian organizations advocating for women,s political, economic and social rights.

RICCIARDONE

dollars & cocaine

wikileaks Guyana – names to watch for


we’ve received a list of names from a contact. these are Guyanese who are mentioned in the wikileaks cables.

  • bharrat jagdeo – chairman of ppp crime family inc.
  • donald ramotar – ceo of ppp crime family inc.
  • janet jagan – the devil
  • cheddi jagan – phantom liberator of Guyana
  • robert corbin – pnc something & enemy of the Guyanese people
  • khemraj ramjattan – afc man
  • sheila holder – afc woman
  • raphael trotman – afc man
  • roger khan – 2bit cocaine hustler doing time for uncle sam
  • sam hinds – negroe puppet prime minister
  • roger luncheon – negroe hitman and brains of jagdeo
  • salim juman azeez – cocaine hustler. owner of new line aqua and hotel tower. DEA & FBI paid him a visit which forced him to go on the run for a few mornings
  • charles ramson – attorney general friend of roger khan. [we believe he had something to do with the murder of satyadeow sawh or at least knows the details behind it]
  • satyadeow sawh
  • barry dataram – cocaine merchant set free by charles ramson [his last act as a judge]
  • leslie ramsammy – minister laptop
  • farouk razack – owner of swiss house cambio.
  • Adnan el-Shukrijumah – supposed al quaeda man given housing and cover by farouk razack and central islamic organisation of Guyana
  • CIOG – involved in too many rackets to mention
  • farouk kalamadeen – lost his head
  • peter morgan – money courier for the cocaine boys under the guise of buying car parts
  • sabrina budhram – sister of peter. laundered millions for the family with her husband
  • arnold budhram – husband of sabrina
  • david clarke – star witness in the roger khan trial
  • manniram prashad – bandit & minister of tourism.
  • brahmer nandlall – cocaine merchant. owner of keishars
  • henry greene – current commissioner of police. banned from usa
  • winston felix – former police commissioner. unleashed the dogs on roger khan forcing him into suriname and into the arms of uncle sam
  • floyd mcdonald – former police commissioner banned from usa
  • george vyphuis – commander of A division
  • paul rodrigues – former police officer & cocaine merchant
  • clay hutson – former police officer & cocaine merchant
  • seelall persaud – crime chief and wife beater
  • clement rohee – minister of home affairs & presidential candidate. banned from usa
  • gail teixeira – failed minister of home affairs during roger khan last days & crime family presidential candidate
  • kwame mccoy – child molestor and presidential spokes[wo]man
  • james singh – canu ceo
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad & Industries Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian goes sexy in Tehran

Mohammed Ali jafari slaps Ahmedinejad


Mahmoud Ahmadinejad & Industries Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian goes sexy in Tehran

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BAKU98 2010-02-11 10:10 2010-12-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Baku
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKB #0098 0421023
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111023Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2384
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYS E C R E T BAKU 000098

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV PARM PHUM AJ IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC
MEETING; TUDEH RE-EMERGING?

REF: A. A) 2009 BAKU 972
¶B. B) 2009 BAKU 921
¶C. C) 2009 BAKU 920 (NOTAL)
d. D) 2009 BAKU 909

Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

¶1. (S) Baku Iran watcher met with xxxxx
(strictly protect – see reftels).

He who Got Slapped
——————

¶2. (S) According to source, President Ahmedinejad surprised
other SNSC members by taking a surprisingly liberal posture
during a mid January post-Ashura meeting of the SNSC called
to discuss next steps on dealing with opposition protests.
Source said that Ahmedinejad claimed that “people feel
suffocated,” and mused that to defuse the situation it may be
necessary to allow more personal and social freedoms,
including more freedom of the press.

¶3. (S) According to source, Ahmedinejad’s statements
infuriated Revolutionary Guard Chief of Staff Mohammed Ali
Jafari, who exclaimed “You are wrong! (In fact) it is YOU
who created this mess! And now you say give more freedom to
the press?!” Source said that Jafarli then slapped
Ahmedinejad in the face, causing an uproar and an immediate
call for a break in the meeting, which was never resumed.
Source said that SNSC did not meet again for another two
weeks, after Ayatollah Janati succesfully acted as a
“peacemaker” between Jafarli and Ahmedinejad. Source added
that the break in the SNSC meeting, but not the slap that
caused it, has made its way on to some Iranian blogs.

Sides Preparing for New Confrontations
————————————–

¶4. (S) Meanwhile, source said, both sides are digging in for
new confrontations, while various sub-groups maneuver. He
stressed the importance of recent speeches by Karroubi and
Khatami to the effect that Ahmedinejad will not be able
finish his term, and that Supreme Leaders should not take
partisan political sides. He stressed that “Karroubi chooses
each word carefully,” and aid the recent speeches reflect an
ongoing effort to split Khameini from the Ahmedinejad group.
Source described the overall political situation within and
without the political elite as “getting worse and worse.” xxxxx
opined that this situation (of protests and instability)
cannot be sustained indefinitely, and predicted that events
are trending towards major developments and a new phases.
Asked what Iran will likely look like over the next year, he
responded “ask me after 22 Bahman (February 11).”

Tudeh Acticsts Re-Emerging?
————————–

¶5. (S) Source (a former non-Marxist revolutionary activist)
also asserted that the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party is
reorganizing among factory and government workers, and
intellectuals. He claimed that many former Tudeh
sympathizers hold positions in the bureaucracy and elsewhere,
and opined that many still privately support the movement.
He mentioned one xxxxx organizer who
has re-emerged behind the scenes of recent bus worker and
other labor strikes.
Lu

Mossad murders Mahmoud Abdul Raouf Mohammad Hassan in Dubai


Assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh

Image via Wikipedia

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ABUDHABI47 2010-01-31 13:01 2010-12-25 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi

VZCZCXRO2451
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHAD #0047/01 0311304
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 311304Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0221
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0009

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000047

SIPDIS
NOFORN
FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/31
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR KPAL KWBG KCRM IS SY AE
SUBJECT: HAMAS COMMANDER KILLED IN DUBAI HOTEL

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (U) On January 29, approximately 9:00 am local time Friday,
Reuters first reported the January 20 murder in a Dubai hotel of
senior Hamas member Mahmoud Abdul Raouf Mohammad Hassan (known as
Mahmoud Al Mabhouh). The brief wire story preceded the release of
an official statement from the Dubai government later in the day.
Al Mabhouh’s remains were flown from Dubai to Syria on January 28.
He was buried January 29 in a refugee camp in Damascus, as Dubai
officials briefed local and international media on his murder.

¶2. (U) The initial Dubai government media office statement said Al
Mabhouh “entered the UAE on January 19 at 3:15 pm from an Arab
country. His body was found in the afternoon of January 20 in a
Dubai hotel where he was staying.” Official statements on January
29 expressed confidence the killers would be arrested: “The ongoing
investigation will speed up and police will be presenting the
suspects to court for trial as soon as possible, in coordination
with Interpol. The suspects left the UAE before the deceased’s
body was found in a Dubai hotel.” (Note: The hotel was the Al
Bustan Rotana near Dubai International Airport. End Note.)

¶3. (U) On Al Jazeera television January 29, Dubai Chief of Police
Dhahi Khalfan Tamim said “I cannot rule out the possibility of
Mossad involvement in the assassination of Mabhouh.” Tamim told
local journalists Dubai Police were “pursuing individual suspects,
not an organization” and that it was “still early to start pointing
fingers on who is behind the crime.” Tamim also confirmed the
victim entered the UAE on a passport bearing his real name, after a
Hamas spokesman in Damascus told the media Al Mabhouh possessed
five passports but traveled frequently to Dubai using his actual
identity.

¶4. (U) Local media coverage on January 30 and 31 focused on
statements from Al Mabhouh’s family members and Hamas officials in
Gaza and Syria, where he lived since 1989. Local and international
media reports noted he was the second foreign militant murdered in
Dubai in less than a year. Former Chechen commander Sulim
Yamadayev was shot and killed near an exclusive Dubai apartment
complex in late March 2009.

¶5. (S/NF) Ambassador happened to be at a social event with Foreign
Minister Abdullah bin Zayed’s media advisor when the story broke,
and he drew the latter’s attention to it. The media advisor
(protect) after making a few calls reported back that the UAE’s
public posture was being discussed between Dubai Ruler Mohammed bin
Rashid and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. The two
options discussed were to say nothing at all, or to reveal more or
less the full extent of the UAE’s investigations. (Comment:
Saying nothing would have been perceived as protecting the Israelis
and in the end, the UAE chose to tell all. The statement was
carefully drafted not to point any fingers, but the reference in
the document (see below) to a gang with western passports will be
read locally as referring to the Mossad. End Comment.)

¶6. (U)

Text of Official Statement

Dubai Police identify suspects in murder of Mahmoud Al Mabhouh

Jan 29, 2010 – 06:18

WAM Dubai, Jan 29th, 2010

WAM)–Dubai Government media office has announced that Dubai police
have identified suspects in the murder crime of Palestinian Hamas
member Mahmoud Abdul Raouf Hassan and that they would soon track
them down and refer to court in conjunction with International

ABU DHABI 00000047 002 OF 002

Police (Interpol).

The suspects were reported to have left the country before the
murder crime was reported. The deceased’s body was later discovered
at a hotel in Dubai.

An official security source in Dubai said that the initial
investigations suggest that the murder was inflicted by experienced
criminal gang, who had been tracking down the movements of the
victim before entering the UAE. “Despite quick skill exhibited by
murderers, yet they left behind evidence at the scene of crime that
would help in tracking them down at earliest. Dubai police no
longer believe in ambiguous or unknown crime”.

The source further disclosed that the investigations revealed that
the suspects hold European passports, adding that Dubai police
would embark in arrangements with Interpol to arrest the suspects
and bring them to books. “The evidence will speedily help competent
authorities to track down the suspects”.

Known as Mahmoud Al Mabhouh, the deceased, a Palestinian, entered
into the UAE at 3.15PM, on Tuesday, Jan. 19, 2010, from an Arab
country. His body was found the following day at afternoon on Jan.
20, 2010, at a hotel he resided at in Dubai.
OLSON

us embassy cables – Dominican Republic is bad for business


Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SANTODOMINGO570 2009-05-18 17:05 2010-12-17 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Santo Domingo

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #0570/01 1381729
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181729Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2771
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 0569
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1158
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 1793
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000570

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR,
LA PAZ FOR A/DCM C LAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS: EAIR KCOR EINV ECON DR
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IS BAD FOR BUSINESS, SAYS
ADVENT INTERNATIONAL

REF: A. 08 SANTO DOMINGO 141
¶B. 08 SANTO DOMINGO 1456

Classified By: Richard Goughnour, Charge d’Affaires, Reasons 1.4(b), (d
)

¶1. (C) Summary: Managers from U.S. investment company Advent
International told EconOffs that they have faced numerous
barriers to their conduct of business since acquiring the
airport concessionaire Aerodom Dominicana Siglo XXI in
October 2008. Among these is a GODR official who has
harassed, threatened and sought bribes from the company.
Also, President Fernandez issued a decree directly
undercutting Aerodom revenue, in direct violation of the
company’s concession. As a result of this difficult business
environment, the Aerodom CEO told EconOff that Advent plans
to turn around the Aerodom asset within five to seven years
and has nixed earlier plans to broaden its investments in the
Dominican Republic. End Summary.

———————————-
Never again, says Advent executive
———————————-

¶2. (C) The CEO of airport concessionaire Aerodom Dominicana
Siglo XXI, a subsidiary of the U.S. investment fund Advent
International, told EconOffs that he has become disillusioned
with the Dominican Republic as a target for investment.
Shortly after Advent purchased Aerodom in October 2008, CEO
Rodolfo Salgado told the Ambassador that this would be the
first of many Advent investments in the Dominican Republic.
Just seven months later, however, Salgado confided to EconOff
that Advent would make no further investments in the country
and sought to turn around Aerodom within five to seven years.
He expressed grave misgivings about a government that
succeeds in attracting investment through good public
relations, pro-business rhetoric and even signing contracts
with favorable terms for investors when in reality the
panorama for foreign investors is muddled with corrupt
intermediaries and a legal framework that is bent to satisfy
the whims of public officials.

¶3. (C) Salgado echoed a growing refrain that the Embassy is
hearing from U.S. investors in the Dominican Republic. “The
Dominican Republic needs to realize that it is becoming
integrated into the global economy and it needs to start
behaving as such,” Salgado said. He noted that Advent has
been investing in Latin America for over 20 years and has
never faced this level of government resistance to the
uninhibited operation of its business. Salgado noted two
particular issues that the company is facing. One is the
harassment by Andres Van Der Horst, the director of the
Airport Department, who has sought to disrupt Aerodom
operations in an apparent attempt for personal gains. The
other is a presidential decree that directly violates
Aerodom’s concessionary contract, the terms of which were
ratified by the Fernandez government at Advent’s request last
October.

¶4. (SBU) Aerodom has completed Foreign Commercial Service
advocacy forms but has not requested Embassy advocacy as of
this time.

——————————————— —
Aviation official pressures Aerodom for a bribe
——————————————— —

¶5. (C) Aerodom CEO Rodolfo Salgado and Advent executive Luis
Solorzano told EconOffs that Van Der Horst has harassed,
threatened and even explicitly solicited a bribe from the
company. The Airport Department, which manages the
state-owned airports not included in the Aerodom concession,
has no direct supervisory role over the Aerodom-operated
facilities. The only legal relationship between the Airport
Department and Aerodom is the fact that Van Der Horst sits on
the Airport Commission, the government agency that oversees
the concession and is chaired by Secretary of Public Works
Victor Diaz Rua.
Salgado noted that although the Airport Commission had not
met for five years prior to Advent’s purchase of Aerodom in
October 2008, it has already met twice since the purchase.
The content of the meetings has focused on what Salgado
described as Van Der Horst’s nitpicky complaints about

out-of-order toilets or damage to a non-essential wall
surrounding the perimeter fence at Las Americas International
Airport (SDQ) in Santo Domingo.

¶6. (C) These complaints and other similar attcks, contained
in what Van Der Horst presented a an official audit of Las
Americas operations autored by the Airport Department (even
though the irport Department has no authority or oversight
f that airport), gained wide coverage in many Domiican
daily newspapers, particularly in late Janury and early
February. At first, Salgado said, h did not understand why
Van Der Horst was attackng his firm. Then, Van Der Horst
asked Salgado o provide free storage space at the airport
for gricultural exporters, a business area where Van Dr
Horst has personal and family interests. When algado
refused this request, Van Der Horst escalated the attacks.
According to Salgado, General Jaime Osas entered Aerodom
executive offices, placed a firearm on a desk and said he had
come “to settle a score between you and my boss.” Osas
served in the military as an at-large general at the time but
made clear that he was representing Van Der Horst during that
hostile encounter. Advent executives complained vehemently
about the incident and Osas was recently retired by President
Fernandez. Aerodom has succeeded in calming the media
attacks by hiring a media relations specialist to explain the
situation to press representatives and correct the claims
made by Van Der Horst.

¶7. (C) Salgado also told EconOffs about an incident that took
place at a recent gala dinner for the travel industry.
Talking over cocktails with a small group of people,
including Salgado and Solorzano, Van Der Horst made the
comment that “For 5 million pesos (about USD 143,000), I
could go away.” While Salgado said Van Der Horst,s tone was
joking, he turned abruptly to face Salgado and Solorzano when
he made this comment. Also present at the time were Arturo
Villanueva, the Vice President of the National Association of
Hotels and Restaurants, and Pablo Lister of the Civil
Aviation Board (JAC). Salgado said that although his tone
was lighthearted, Van Der Horst’s message was clear and
pointed.

¶8. (C) In both of their meetings with EconOffs, the Aerodom
executives have reiterated their commitment to avoid corrupt
practices and assured the Embassy that they would not succumb
to Van Der Horst’s solicitations. In addition to discussing
this issue with EmbOffs on various occasions, including
meetings with EconOffs on February 4 and April 22, Salgado
said he has broached this subject with Foreign Minister
Carlos Morales Troncoso, Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Manuel
Trullols, Dominican Civil Aviation Institute Director (IDAC)
Jose Tomas Perez, Defense Minister Pedro Pena Antonio, Public
Works Minister Diaz, and members of the JAC. The response
from these officials was all similar, Salgado said. Diaz
told him, “It’s just Andres.” Morales said, “That man is
corrupt.”

¶9. (C) Advent Senior Partner Juan Carlos Torres came to the
Dominican Republic on April 23 to meet with President
Fernandez. According to Salgado, during the meeting, Torres,
Salgado and Aerodom advisor Jose Luis Abraham explained in
“polite” terms that they had trouble dealing with Van Der
Horst. After the meeting, Abraham, a close associate of
Fernandez, remained with the President and told him more
details of the Van Der Horst problems. President Fernandez
assured Abraham that he would instruct Van Der Horst to back
off, and noted that August 16 is typically a day when
personnel changes are announced. Salgado was not sure
whether President Fernandez was implying that he would remove
Van Der Horst in August or whether he would simply use this
possibility to exert control over Van Der Horst. Salgado
said that, so far, President Fernandez’ intervention appears
to be helping.

——————————————— ——–
Fernandez ratified Aerodom contract, then violated it
——————————————— ——–

¶10. (SBU) Aerodom also complained of a different, though
related, affront on the company’s business. In late
February, President Fernandez issued a decree eliminating a 4
cent fee charged on air cargo exports of vegetables. This
was a recommendation from the national economic summit that

Fernandez held in February to address the global crisis.
This fee represents one of the primary revenue generators for
Aerodom and is an integral component of the concession
contract. Solorzano said that this decree would cost Aerodom
millions of dollars per year, cutting profits by as much as
30 percent. Salgado told EconOffs he has spoken with
Economy, Planning and Development Minister Temistocles Montas
and Customs Director General Miguel Cocco about the decree.
They both acknowledged that the decree was illegal, but
neither was willing to inform the president that he had made
a mistake. Salgado said he was suspicious that Van Der Horst
may have had a hand in pushing the decree to the President’s
desk without a diligent legal review; the decree is very
favorable to agricultural exporters.

¶11. (SBU) Salgado said that this decree was the primary
reason for Torres’ visit and the meeting with President
Fernandez. He said that President Fernandez reacted “frankly
and openly” when they told him that the decree violated their
contract. But Fernandez stopped short of offering to rescind
the decree, instead asking Aerodom for help in strategizing a
solution that would allow him to “save face.” Salgado said
that one possibility would be to impose the fee on airlines
that carry cargo and let them pass the costs on to the
exporters. Fernandez told the Aerodom executives that Montas
would contact them about the solution, but Salgado said he is
becoming impatient as three weeks have passed without any
visible progress.

——-
Comment
——-

¶12. (SBU) The Advent experience is unfortunately typical of
foreign investors who arrive in the Dominican Republic
enthused by a legal framework that, on paper, appears
favorable to business when in reality the investment climate
is much less certain. When asked in December about his
impression of the new Aerodom management, the general manager
of the privately owned and operated La Romana International
Airport told EconOff that the American company needs to
“aplatanarse”, a term that refers to learning to behave like
a Dominican, in order to survive. Yet if Dominican
government officials wish to attract and retain foreign
investors, they cannot require these investors to participate
in the rampant corruption of “negocios aplatanados”
(Dominican-style business). It is the local business climate
that needs to reform, not the foreign investors.
End Comment.

¶13. (U) Please visit us at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/
GOUGHNOUR

Mrs. Lorna Golding

Lorna Golding on hillary clinton & charles rangel nefarious influences


Mrs. Lorna Golding

Mrs. Lorna Golding

Monday, 14 December 2009, 20:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000761
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (J.MACK-WILSON, V.DEPIRRO, W.SMITH)
L/LEI (C.HOLLAND, A.KLUESNER)
INR/IAA (G.BOHIGIAN)
JUSTICE FOR OIA (P.PETTY)
TREASUTY FOR ERIN NEPHEW
INR/RES (R.WARNER)
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/14
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, SOCI, CVIS, SNAR, PINR, ASEC, CJAN
KCOR, AID, IMF, JM, XL”>XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: PRIME MINISTER’S WIFE SEES “NEFARIOUS INFLUENCES”
ON SECRETARY CLINTON
REF: A. KINGSTON 753; B. KINGSTON 1050; C. KINGSON 759 D. KINGSTON 1070
CLASSIFIED BY: Isiah Parnell, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

Summary and Analysis:

——————————

1. (C) Lorna Golding, the wife of Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding, told Post’s Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Patricia Attkisson that she believes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is under the “pernicious influence” of U.S. Representative Charles Rangel regarding the contentious U.S. extradition request for Christopher “Dudus” Coke. In an often surreal and disjointed conversation, Mrs. Golding alleged that Congressman Rangel is a “sympathizer” of the opposition People’s National Party (PNP) who is “manipulated” by PNP elements in the Jamaican diaspora in the U.S. and is “whispering in Secretary Clinton’s ear” in order to “downgrade” the governing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the Government of Jamaica (GOJ). Mrs. Golding also blamed this cabal for the White House’s delay in naming a new ambassador and the GOJ’s difficulties in finalizing a Standby Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although it appears unlikely that Mrs. Golding was delivering a message on behalf of the PM, Mrs. Golding’s rambling comments and penchant for sharing conspiracy theories with a key member of the U.S. Embassy community is consistent with a growing sense among many of indecisiveness and a lack of direction on the part of the PM and the JLP. End Summary and Analysis.

“Pernicious Influence”

—————————-

2. (C) The invitation to the PAO to meet for afternoon tea on December 11 at the PM’s residence had been unexpected; there were no other guests in attendance and no tea was actually served, although the PAO was offered some salad that Mrs. Golding said the Prime Minister had prepared the previous evening. Mrs. Golding didn’t seem to be using any talking points, although the PM was aware of the PAO’s presence and in fact dropped in for some small talk later in the meeting. (NOTE: This suggests that Mrs. Golding’s opinions were not necessarily intended as an effort on the part of the PM’s office to establish some sort of backchannel communication or to present any informal messages or official GOJ policy. End Note).

3.(C) The PAO’s conversation with Mrs. Golding covered a wide array of topics, from salads and manicures to the Coke extradition request (Ref A) and Jamaica’s pending negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (Ref B). Mrs. Golding expressed her belief that Secretary Clinton’s failure to mention the GOJ in the Department’s traditional Independence Day congratulatory message to the Jamaican people in August 2009 had been an intentional slight, instigated by the PNP through its “nefarious influence” on Secretary Clinton. Similarly, Mrs. Golding attributed the Coke extradition request to Congressman Rangel’s “whispering in Secretary Clinton’s ear” and the PNP’s “pernicious influence” within the Jamaican diaspora, and insisted that the extradition request had been orchestrated as a means of embarrassing her husband politically.

PM Needs “Bigging Up”

——————————

4. (C) Despite assurances to the contrary, Mrs. Golding remained convinced, as do many Jamaicans, that the White House’s delay in naming a new U.S. ambassador is because Jamaica has been “downgraded” as a result of the extradition request delay (NOTE: Mrs. Golding was apparently unaware that, earlier in the week, the Office of the Prime Minister had released a statement to the press indicating that the delay in naming an ambassador was due to the White House’s “preoccupation with other matters” and was unrelated to the extradition request. Ref A. End Note) . Mrs. Golding alluded to the JLP’s historical ties to the U.S.’s Republican party and the close ties between former JLP PM Edward Seaga and President Reagan, then requested that President Obama “reach out” to the Prime Minister as a means of “bigging him up” (i.e., raising his stature). Nevertheless, Mrs. Golding had nothing but praise for USAID’s activities in the country and referred to the USAID Director as a “true friend” of Jamaica.

5. (C) The PAO inquired as to how new revenues would be spent if, as now appears likely (Ref C), the GOJ enters into a new IMF Standby Agreement. Mrs. Golding downplayed the likelihood of new spending on infrastructure or social welfare programs and insisted that all new revenues would be allocated toward paying down Jamaica’s debt. The PM “feels strongly that the Government of Jamaica has to pay its bills,” Mrs. Golding stated, a belief she says he inherited from his mother.

Conclusion and Analysis

——————————-

6. (C) Mrs. Golding insisted that she had invited the PAO to have tea on her own initiative and that the PM, although aware of the meeting, hadn’t put her up to it. This is likely true, given that Mrs. Golding appeared completely unprepared, could not stay on message, and had no apparent talking points or agenda. If the PM had hoped to establish a backchannel for discussions with Post or to convey some informal messages to the USG regarding the Coke extradition request, the status of IMF negotiations, or some other matter of mutual concern, it would appear that the opportunity was lost. This is consistent with past practice, however, as the PM and the JLP GOJ have missed a number of opportunities in recent months to signal their willingness to make difficult decisions or to address the myriad economic and social crises the nation faces (Ref D). End Conclusion and Analysis. Parnell